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Abstract 
The implications of the intricate pattern of relationships formed by company directors holding positions on 
multiple corporate boards, or ‘interlocking’, have long been the subject of speculation and investigation. While 
this web of inter-firm relationships is no longer regarded as prime facia evidence of collusive activity, a growing 
body of research on US firms has identified a range of performance effects on firms associated with information 
flows in these networks. Yet research on the role of director networks and firm performance is far from 
comprehensive and has largely been limited to the largest US corporates. 
This paper extends the existing research in this field by drawing together the principal findings to date and 
testing these in a different national context and with a much larger dataset than used previously. The 
relationship between director interlocks and corporate performance is examined among 6428 UK firms, those 
with annual turnover of £100 million or more. Social network and regression analysis is used to detect 
significant relationships between the pattern of director interlinking and corporate performance. 
A number of significant relationships are identified, broadly consistent with the US research but some 
phenomena distinctive to the UK is found, reflecting differences in the structure and sociology of capital markets 
in the two countries. In particular the role of executive directors is much less significant to the general financial 
performance of UK firms than to US firms and is more focused on reputational concerns in capital markets. 
Keywords: Interlocking Directorates, Corporate Performance, Business Networks, Information dissemination 
Recent controversies regarding the governance of 
public companies have highlighted the importance 
of the selection of directors.1 Attention has focused 
largely on the balance between executive and non-
executive directors and the establishment of 
mechanisms to preserve the independence and 
critical eye of the latter. Yet the value of directors to 
a company is not limited to their supervisory role. 
The personal experience, breadth of knowledge, 
business intelligence and contacts of directors are 
often important additions to the resource base of a 
firm. 
While the significance of a firm marshalling such 
strategic knowledge assets, if they may be called, is 
appreciated intuitively, there has been little 
systematic identification of the source, impact and 
ultimate value of directors as a strategic resource. 
Business research has noted a general association 
between quality of directors and firm performance, 
although highly contingent on the mechanisms of 
governance alluded to above. Factors such as 
education, age, breadth and depth of experience, and 
experience relevant to the particular interests of the 
firm all affect the contribution of a director to the 
performance of a company. 
Increasingly, however, research suggests that the 
network of relationships maintained by directors 
with the business community at large can have a 
critical impact on a firm’s performance. In addition 
                                                          
1 We are grateful for the comments and suggestions made on this 
paper by Ferda Halicioglu and Leslie Johnson. 
there is some evidence that directors’ relationships 
with financial institutions can be important to the 
funding of firms. These findings highlight the 
strategic role of directors as collectors, synthesisers 
and applicators of business intelligence as well as an 
executive role as networkers. 
No systematic examination of the relationship 
between director networking and the performance of 
firms has yet been undertaken, however, and the 
preliminary research that does exist in this area deals 
almost exclusively with US firms. This study takes a 
step towards a more systematic examination by 
investigating the pattern of director networking in 
the UK and among a much greater number of firms 
than in any previous directorate interlock study. 
The research utilises existing databases of 
company directors, using social network analytical 
techniques to identify social relationships among 
directors. The pattern of relationships identified is 
compared to financial performance data of the 
respective firms with the aim of isolating the most 
significant types of relationship. 
The Effects of Director Interlocking 
The potential for the transfer of competitively 
valuable information between firms arises when a 
director of one firm serves simultaneously on the 
board of another firm, forming a director interlock 
between the firms. Because of directors’ roles as part 
of the governing institution in a firm, they tend to 
have knowledge of critical information about the 
competitive position of the firm, particularly if they 
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are executive directors. Interlocking directors will 
have knowledge of the competitive position of a 
range of firms in different situations and thus will 
tend to have greater access to competitively valuable 
information than directors who do not interlock. 
This information may concern the specific 
competitive position of another firm, ‘insider’ 
knowledge that directors are often anxious to insist 
is protected by professional ethics. It may reflect the 
greater awareness interlocking directors have of 
potential sources of supply of resources valuable to a 
firm, such as finance or new technologies. Or it may 
comprise a more general wisdom about the business 
environment and factors or strategies that contribute 
competitive advantage. The potential of these 
information channels to contribute to competitive 
advantage, then, suggests that corporate financial 
performance will be influenced by particular types 
of director interlocks. 
The potential for interlocking directorships to 
provide firms with privileged information has been a 
central focus in the long history of studies of director 
interlocking. From the 1913 Pujo Commission 
through the elite studies of the 1960s and 70s, 
director interlocks were assumed prima facia 
evidence of potential collusion. Yet empirical 
evidence of collusive benefits to firms has been 
limited (see the survey by Mizruchi 1996), a 
situation reinforced by the rarity of interlocks 
between firms being re-established once broken 
(Palmer 1983),2 although around half of broken ties 
are reconstituted with similar types of firms (Stearns 
& Mizruchi, 1986). 
Studies of more general types of interlocks have 
also found little evidence of specific benefits. From 
a resource dependency perspective, where firms 
establish relationships with other firms to reduce 
uncertainty of access to critical resources, firms 
could be expected to maintain social relationships, 
such as shared directors, with suppliers of critical 
inputs (Pfeffer 1972). Burt (1983), however, found 
no effect on profitability of having important 
customers, suppliers or banks represented on boards.  
More surprisingly, perhaps, a negative relationship 
between performance and interlocks with banks has 
been found in a number of US studies, assessed in 
terms of solvency (Dooley 1969,3 Mizruchi & 
Stearns 19884) or equity-debt (Pfeffer 1972,5 
                                                          
2 Useem (1984) found 25 percent of his respondents’ invitations 
to join boards were related to inter-organisational  resource issues. 
Richardson (1987) suggests the limited evidence of a relationship 
between director interlocks and profitability is due to 
methodological limitations, as the only important interlocks are 
the sort that are reconstituted. He found a strong relationship 
between reconstituted interlocks and profitability of Canadian 
firms. 
3 Based on the Fortune 200 nonfinancial and 50 financial 
corporations. The specific measure was the acid test. 
4 Based on a panel study of the largest and smallest Fortune 500 
firm in eleven industry groups 1953-83. 
5 Based on 80 nonfinancial companies. 
Mizruchi & Stearns 1988).6 Bank interlocking was 
also found to be negatively associated with 
profitability in the US, assessed in terms of  return 
on assets or return on equity (Fligstein & Brantley 
1992,7  Mizruchi & Stearns 1988), return on sales or 
price earnings ratio (Fligstein & Brantley 1992).8 
Such results have been interpreted as firms seeking 
bank representation as a response to weak 
profitability and thus reducing supply uncertainty 
through cooption (Dooley 1969, Pfeffer 1972, Burt 
1983, Mizruchi & Stearns 1988).9 Further, Douthett 
and Jung (2001) found Japanese firms more 
responsive to poor performance the closer their 
directorate interlocking. 
While the resource dependency perspective has 
only identified rather prescribed specific  benefits to 
firms, director networks have been found to provide 
boards with a general ‘scan’ of the business 
environment and a channel for the diffusion of new 
business practices (Useem 1984, Haunschild 1994). 
Yet, if director interlocks provide access to business 
intelligence, even in general terms, some impact on 
firm performance should be evident, as the extent 
and pattern of interlocking varies between firms and 
between countries (see Stockman et al. 1985). 
Pennings (1980) and Burt (1983) found a weak 
positive relationship between director interlocks and 
profitability among US firms, while profitability has 
been positively associated with the proportion of 
outside directors (Baysinger & Butler 1985, 
Whidbee 199710). A recent study of Singaporean 
firms found a positive relationship between 
interlocking in general, profit before tax, return on 
sales, return on assets and solvency (Ong et al. 
2003). 
A number of interlock studies have focused on the 
assumed more activist role of executive directors 
and Chief Executive Officers (CEOs). Executive 
directors who sit on other boards are seen more 
likely to represent the firm they work for and thus be 
resource seeking or cooptive, more than providing 
the integrative ‘scanning’ role identified by Useem 
(1984). Booth and Deli (1996) found weaker firm 
performance where executives served on other 
boards. But Kaplan and Reishus (1990) found 
                                                          
6 However, the relationship varies with different indicators of 
‘distress’ (Pennings 1980), Allen (1974) finding the equity-debt 
ratio positively related with bank interlocks. 
7 Based on a panel study of 100 US industrial firms 1969-79. 
Profitability measures significantly related were the price earnings 
ratio, return on assets, profit margin and return on equity and 
additionally in 1980 the debt equity ratio. The bank interlock data 
was limited to 63 percent of the sample, however (Fligstein & 
Brantley 1992, p. 291). 
8 Meeusen & Cuyvers (1985) found a positive association 
between financial interlocking and profitability in the Netherlands 
and in Belgium. 
9 This interpretation has generally subsumed earlier suggestions 
that the phenomenon reflected banks’ desires to secure their loans 
(e.g. Aldrich 1979), though Richardson (1987) provides strong 
evidence of bank initiation of interlocks in Canada. 
10 Measured by return on assets. 
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stronger firm performance where a CEO served on 
an external board.11  Yeo et al (2003) found a greater 
return on assets among firms with reciprocal CEO 
interlocks, the CEO serving on a board whose CEO 
served on their own board, a characteristic of large 
French firms.  
There is reason to expect some difference in the 
impact of director interlocks on UK firms to that 
found in other countries. First,  the network of 
director interlocks is sparse in the UK and US, the 
density of the largest cluster in the directorate 
network among the UK top 250 firms in 1976 the 
lowest (0.03) in Stockman and Wasseur’s (1985) 
international comparison, although similar to the US 
(0.04). Similarly, Windloff (2002) recently found 
US and UK firms also sharing low rates of multiple 
interlocks with a single firm (0.6 percent and 2.1 
percent, respectively cf. 14-23 percent in continental 
Europe). Second, UK and US firms tend to be larger 
and more internationalised than continental 
European firms. This suggests UK and US directors 
are more likely to be involved in broad ‘scanning’ 
than resource-specific cooptive activity, attributable 
to the greater reliance for funding in these countries 
on capital markets than on specific financial 
institutions (Scott 1991).  
However, UK directors also differ significantly 
from the US in terms of interlocking propensity. 
Only eleven percent of UK directors held multiple 
directorships in 1976, the lowest in Stockman and 
Wasseur’s (1985) survey and much lower than the 
USA’s 18 percent. Britain also scored lowest for the 
number of directorships held per director, (1.15 cf. 
1.28 in the US) and the number of ‘big linkers’ with 
four or more directorships (4 cf. 39 in the US) 
(Stockman & Wasseur 1985). A more recent study 
by O’Sullivan (2000) found 0.22 external 
directorships per director in the UK, more frequent 
among longer-tenured executives of larger firms, 
with activist boards.12  Thus, it can be expected that 
the ‘activist’ role of executive directors in 
interlocking for firm specific resource reasons will 
be much less in the UK than in the US. 
A number of hypotheses can be drawn from this 
discussion: 
H1. Larger firms have more extensive directorate 
interlocks as directors of larger firms are likely to have a 
wider range of social relations among other firms and are 
more likely to be sought for board positions. This 
hypothesis serves something of a control as this finding 
is well established in previous studies. 
H2. Directorate interlocks will be less extensive among 
more internationalised firms as these firms will seek the 
experience of directors in countries they are operating in 
rather than recruiting from domestic firms. 
                                                          
11 Performance measured by dividend cuts.  
12 Based on the 175 largest UK firms in 1995. 
H3. More profitable firms will exhibit more extensive 
interlocking in general because the wider access to 
general business intelligence provided by interlocking is 
likely to be competitively valuable. This is in line with 
previous findings about US firms. 
H4. More profitable firms will be closer to the centre of 
the network of UK directors because such firms are 
likely to have greater access to more competitively 
valuable information about the business environment. 
From the viewpoint of ‘social capital’ theory, firms with 
the greatest number of interlocks with firms, who 
themselves have many interlocks, are likely to gain the 
greatest information from the network. Alternatively, 
from the viewpoint of  ‘brokerage’ theory it is those 
firms who receive the most critical information from the 
network who are in the position to make the greatest 
gains (see Burt 1992). 
H5. Firms with weaker capital adequacy are likely to 
interlock more extensively, and interlock with financial 
institutions in particular, as firms in ‘distress’ seek to 
reduce uncertainty drawing on the experience of other 
firms. This is in line with findings about US firms. 
H6. Firms with weaker capital adequacy are likely to 
interlock with financial institutions in particular, as they 
seek specialised financial expertise and perhaps 
preferential access to loan capital. Again, this is in line 
with findings about US firms, operating in a similar 
capital funding environment. 
H7. More profitable firms are likely to exhibit more 
extensive executive interlocking as this is typically more 
purposive and likely to result in resource benefits for the 
firm and improved competitive advantage. But this effect 
will be less pervasive in the UK than among US firms 
because of the more limited role of executive director 
interlocking in the UK. 
Data and Analysis 
The data set for this study comprises UK registered 
firms in 2004 with a latest year turnover of £100 
million or greater. Information on the directors and 
financial performance of these 6428 firms was 
drawn from the Bureau van Dijk FAME database 
(Bureau van Dijk 2004). 
Please see Appendix for Table 1. 
Director interlocks and network metrics were 
calculated using UCINET 6 (Borgatti, Everett & 
Freeman 2002). Three interlocking metrics were 
used: Freeman degree centrality, which counts the 
number of interlocks per firm, Bonacich’s 
normalised eigenvector centrality, which measures 
the centrality of each firm to the network of 
interlocking directors as a whole, and Freeman’s 
normalised betweenness, which is a measure of 
critical information throughput. 
Figure 1 presents a sociogram of a subset of the 
interlocking directorate drawn from this analysis, the 
interlocks among the 1570 UK firms with turnover 
of £500 million or more, excluding isolated diodes 
for clarity. Figure 1 demonstrates the discontinuous 
nature of the ‘network’, with a large number of, 
generally equity-related, small clusters around a 
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large dense central cluster. The largest component 
was therefore isolated for further analysis. As Table 
1 reports, and illustrated in Figure 2, this component 
was fragmented, with low density.13 
Because of the discontinuous nature of the whole 
sample, eigenvector centrality and betweenness 
could not be meaningfully calculated as these are 
functions of the whole network. So these metrics 
were calculated only for the main component. But 
additional indicators of interlocking propensity - 
degree centrality, the interlock-director ratio, the 
executive director ratio, the number of executive 
director interlocks and the number of interlocks with 
financial institutions were calculated for each firm - 
for both the main component and the sample as a 
whole. 
The six indicators of interlocking were then 
subject to ordinary least squares multiple regression 
against a range of financial performance variables, 
using SPSS 11.5. The first of these, turnover is a 
common measure of firm size in interlock studies 
(Mizruchi & Stearns 1988). Overseas sales was 
included on the expectation that internationally 
operating firms were likely to develop distinct 
director networks offshore. Five measures of 
profitability were included: return on assets 
(employed by Fligstein & Brantley 1992, Mizruchi 
& Stearns 1988, Whidbee 1997’ Ong et al. 2003; 
Yeo et al. 2003), return on shareholders’ funds 
(employed by Fligstein & Brantley 1992, Mizruchi 
& Stearns 1988), profit margin  (employed by 
Fligstein & Brantley 1992, Ong et al. 1993), return 
on capital employed, which adds long term debt to 
shareholder equity, and gross profits. Three 
indicators of capital adequacy were included: the 
solvency ratio, a measure of short-term liquidity (the 
acid test, employed by Dooley 1969, Mizruchi & 
Stearns 1988, Ong et al. 2003), gearing (the debt-
equity ratio, employed by Pfeffer 1972, Allen 1974, 
Mizruchi & Stearns 1988, Fligstein & Brantley 
1992), a measure of long-term debt constraint, and 
net tangible assets. Finally, the price-earnings ratio 
was included as an indicator of market assessment of 
corporate performance (after Fligstein & Brantley 
1992). Table 2 presents the means and standard 
deviations of the variables and Table 3 presents a 
correlation matrix of the independent variables, 
which does not suggest colinearity. Please see 
Appendix for Table 2 & 3. 
                                                          
13 Drawn in Pajek 0.85 using the Fruchterman Reingold method 
(Batagelj & Mrvar, 1998). 
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Figure 1 
Sociogram of director interlocks among subset of UK firms. 
Figure 2 
Sociogram of main component of UK director interlock network. 
Results and Discussion 
Table 4 presents the results of an ordinary least 
squares regression for each of the dependent 
variables examined with respect to the sample as a 
whole. Please see Appendix for Table 4. The first 
column reports the association between the number 
of director interlocks and the selected financial 
indicators. There is a significant positive association 
with turnover and negative association with overseas 
sales, supporting the first two hypotheses. There is a 
significant, positive association between the number 
of interlocks and a firm’s profit margin, an interlock 
associated with a 0.2 percent greater profit margin. 
This supports the third hypothesis, although there 
was no significant association between interlocking 
and the other, arguably more important measures of 
profitability. There was a negative, significant 
association with net tangible assets, again supporting 
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the fifth hypothesis, but with no significant results 
for the other measures of capital adequacy. This is in 
line with, but weaker than, findings in the US. 
Finally, there is a significant positive association 
between interlocking and the price/earnings ratio, 
which Fligstein and Brantley (1992) interpreted as a 
measure of profitability in the US but which must 
also speak about capital market perceptions. The 
combination of variables is significant to the pattern 
of director interlocking, with around 27 percent of 
the variation accounted for by these associations. 
Thus, the character of UK executive director 
interlocking and interlocks with financial institutions 
in general is notably distinct from that in the US, 
suggesting behavioural responses to differences in 
the operation of capital markets in these countries. 
The second column of Table 4 reports the 
association between the propensity of directors to 
interlock and the selected financial indicators. 
Again, turnover is positively, and overseas turnover 
and net tangible assets negatively, associated with 
propensity to interlink, though the association is 
weaker than with the number of interlocks, as would 
be expected. This provides further support for 
hypotheses 1, 2 and 5. But the propensity to interlink 
is also significantly associated with the return on 
shareholders funds and negatively with the solvency 
ratio. This suggests that a general activism among 
directors, in terms of interlocks, may pay dividends 
in terms of profitability and in response to short-
term capital adequacy issues. This adds further 
support to hypotheses 3 and 5. The combination of 
variables is significant to the pattern of interlock 
propensity, accounting for around 19 percent of the 
variation. 
The third column of Table 4 reports the association 
between the number of interlocks with financial 
institutions and the selected financial indicators. 
Only one variable is significant, a positive 
association with the solvency ratio. This is 
inconsistent with the sixth hypothesis, which 
expected similar, albeit weaker, results to research 
on US firms but not contrary results. While, from 
column 2, it can be seen that UK firms with low 
solvency are more likely to interlock with firms in 
general, the evidence here is that UK firms that 
interlock with financial institutions have a greater 
than average solvency ratio. This suggests the 
existence of a subset of UK firms exists with closer 
than average relationships with financial institutions 
and specific prudential benefits.   
The fourth column of Table 4 reports the 
association between the ratio of executive directors 
to total directors and the selected financial variables, 
which research on US firms suggests is associated 
with specific benefits to firms because of executive 
activism. Here, there is a small significant positive 
association with overseas turnover and significant 
negative associations with profitability. While the 
latter supports the final hypothesis, it suggests that 
either executive activism is spectacularly 
unsuccessful in the UK or, more likely, that UK 
directors are motivated to expand their interlocking, 
perhaps in search of specific benefits or knowledge, 
when their firms face profitability difficulties. This 
contrasts with research on US firms, where financial 
distress is associated with financial institution 
interlocks. However, the combination of financial 
variables in this investigation accounts for only 
4.5% of the variation in the propensity for executive 
directors to interlock. 
The last column in Table 4 suggests that executive 
activism in the UK, in terms of director interlocks, 
has only limited success in terms of the financial 
variables investigated. While, from column 4, the 
propensity of executive directors to interlock is 
negatively associated with profitability, the results of 
that interlocking are not. The only significant 
association with UK executive director interlocking 
is a positive association with the price-earnings 
ratio, an additional executive interlock associated 
with a 0.6% increase in this ratio. This is probably 
less an indicator of profitability than that of status 
effects in UK capital markets. 
Some differences in this pattern emerge when the 
main component of the sample, the central 
interconnected network of interlocks, is examined. 
Table 5 presents the results of an ordinary least 
squares regression for each of the dependent 
variables examined with respect to the main 
component alone. Please see Appendix for Table 5. 
The first column of Table 5 reports the association 
between the number of director interlocks within the 
main component and the selected financial 
indicators. These are very similar to those for the 
sample as a whole, suggesting the dominance of the 
main component on the earlier results. The 
exception is the less significant association with the 
price-earnings ratio (sig. = 0.058 cf. 0.048) than that 
evident in the sample as a whole. 
The relationship between the propensity to 
interlock and the financial variables, presented in 
column 2, also varies somewhat from the sample as 
a whole. The positive association with return on 
shareholders funds and negative association with net 
tangible assets found in the whole sample are not 
found in the main component and the negative 
association with solvency is weaker. The 
combination of variables is significant to the pattern 
of interlock propensity within the main component, 
but accounts for only seven percent of the variation. 
This suggests that interlocking within the central 
cluster of firms is less involved with issues of capital 
adequacy and profitability than interlocking broadly 
is. 
The third and fourth columns report the association 
between a firm’s centrality within the main network 
component and the financial variables. There is no 
significant association between normalised 
eigenvector centrality and financial performance, as 
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would be expected from a social capital perspective, 
where the accumulated connections provide 
information advantages over other members of the 
network. There are, however, associations between a 
firm’s intermediary position within the network and 
three financial indicators. The evidence suggests that 
larger firms tend to be ‘between’ more interlocks 
within the network, and more internationalised firms 
less-so, not at odds with the first two hypotheses. 
But betweenness is negatively associated with 
profitability, contrary to the fourth hypothesis. Firms 
do not seem able to gain any brokering advantage 
from centrality within the director interlock network 
and in fact there appear to be profit advantages 
associated with peripheral positions. The interaction 
among the variables accounts for 42 percent of the 
variation in the data. 
The results presented in columns 5 and 7, for 
interlocks with financial institutions and by 
executive directors, are virtually identical to the 
sample as a whole. This suggests that the possible 
prudential and reputational benefits of networking 
derive from the interconnectedness of the main 
component rather than broad interlocking in general. 
As this pattern of interlocking differs markedly from 
the broad interlocking associated with profitability 
or capital inadequacy in general, this reinforces the 
suggestion that interlocks by executive directors and 
with financial institutions are the behaviour of 
specific subsets of firms obtaining specific benefits. 
The financial performance associated with the 
propensity of executive directors within the main 
component to interlock, presented in column 6, 
however, does differ from that of the sample as a 
whole. The positive association with 
internationalisation and negative associations with 
profit and profit margin evident in the sample as a 
whole are present within the main component. But 
there are also significant positive associations with 
the return on total assets and the price-earnings ratio. 
If the propensity for executives to interlock is 
motivated by profitability difficulties, it appears that 
interlocking within the main interconnected 
component may be beneficial in terms of share 
prices and the revaluation of assets (rising return on 
assets alongside lower profits suggesting shrinking 
assets). 
Conclusion 
In general, the hypotheses of this study were 
supported by the evidence collected from this large 
sample and large proportion of UK firms. Director 
interlocking is more prevalent among larger firms 
and less-so among more internationalised firms. This 
supports the view that larger firms are able to draw 
from a wide circle of relationships and have a 
greater need to do so because of the relatively 
greater importance of the broad business 
environment to their activities. Internationalised 
firms most likely seek this business intelligence 
more in overseas markets. 
Interlocking is associated with higher profit 
margins and higher returns on shareholders funds. 
While this may represent the benefits of broad 
knowledge of the business environment, the business 
scan, there is some evidence of interlocking 
addressing specific resource uncertainties. In line 
with US findings, UK firms facing capital adequacy 
difficulties have a greater propensity to interlock. At 
the same time and somewhat as expected, executive 
director interlocking in the UK appears to be a 
response to profitability difficulties in the UK, rather 
than a source of profitability as reported by research 
in the US, and its main impact appears to be on the 
price-earnings ratio. 
The weaker impact of financial distress on director 
interlocking in the UK than in the US suggests that 
while, after Scott (1991), UK and US capital funding 
share many similarities, there remain many 
differences. The significance of the relationship 
between executive activism and the price-earnings 
ratio may represent reputational effects in capital 
markets. Direct director interlocks appear to be a 
more important means of reducing uncertainty in the 
US than in the UK, where capital market participants 
have an arguably wider range of social relationships 
with which to develop and maintain relationships of 
confidence or trust (see Cain & Hopkins 2001).  
In these terms, the failure to find supporting 
evidence for our fourth hypothesis that benefits of 
interlocking accrue more to the most central firms, is 
not surprising. If director interlocks were the only or 
primary social relationship between firms, then the 
centrality of firms in UK director interlocks network 
would be critical to the scanning function, as it 
arguably is in the US. But the evidently more 
disparate nature of the UK director network 
underlies the importance of other, less formal social 
relationships among UK firms.   
Thus, directors add value to firms in more than 
their direct governing role over the internal affairs of 
the company. The relationships directors maintain 
with the broader business community have 
significant influence on profitability. As in the US, 
UK firms maintain direct linkages with the boards of 
a range of other companies commensurate with the 
scale of their activities in the UK economy; broad 
knowledge of business affairs is valuable. For firms 
in financial difficulty, board level linkages have 
particular importance, with executive directors are 
centrally involved in this process. Unlike the US, 
such efforts seem targeted at general reputational 
effects in capital markets rather than at specific 
institutional support. Director interlocks in the UK 
appear to be one dimension of a rich tapestry of 
informal social relations that constitute the business 
environment. 
There is scope for further research on the 
recognition of the value of director interlocks in the 
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recruitment of directors and their decisions to serve 
on multiple boards. The identification and mapping 
of other dimensions of the social relationships 
between firms and further cross-national 
comparisons would deepen understanding of the 
reputational effects suggested here. 
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Appendix  
Table 1 
Characteristics of the Main Network Component 
Characteristic Value 
N 3910 
Average distance 8.041 
Distance-based cohesion 0.141 
Distance-weighted fragmentation 0.859 
Density 0.0016 
(SD) (0.0688) 
 
Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations of Board Characteristics and Variables 
Variable Mean S. D. 
Directors 6.25 9.9 
Executive directors 1.13 0.47 
Interlocks (Freeman degree centrality) 4.10 2.2 
Interlock propensity (interlocks per director)  0.24 0.32 
Interlocks with financial institutions 0.28 1.76 
Executive director proportion  0.26 0.11 
Interlocks per executive  1.52 1.91 
Turnover (£m latest year) 651.9 2578.7 
Overseas turnover (£m latest year) 166.0 2154.4 
Return on shareholders funds (%  latest year) 22.3 98.0 
Return on capital employed (%  latest year) 12.82 73.7 
Return on total assets (%  latest year) 3.33 34.11 
Profit margin (%  latest year) 4.36 14.33 
Profit  before taxation (£m latest year) 13.2 499.8 
Solvency ratio (%  latest year) 34.5 34.3 
Gearing (%  latest year) 438 1068 
Net tangible assets (£m latest year) 810.8 4739.0 
Shareholders funds (£m latest year) 504.1 4350.6 
UK turnover (£m latest year) 459.7 1341.7 
Price / earnings ratio (low latest year) 7.4 68.3 
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Table 3 
Correlation Matrix of Independent Variables – All Firms 
 
 
Director Networks and UK Corporate Performance 
1205 
Table 5 
Relationship between Director Interlocks and Financial Performance – Main 
Component 
 
 
